Memetics and Neural Models of Conspiracy Theories by Duch, Włodzisław
  
 
 
Abstract  Conspiracy theories, or in general seriously distorted beliefs, are widespread. How and why 
are they formed in the brain is still more a matter of speculation rather than science. In this paper one 
plausible mechanisms is investigated: rapid freezing of high neuroplasticity (RFHN). Emotional arousal 
increases neuroplasticity and leads to creation of new pathways spreading neural activation. Using the 
language of neurodynamics a meme is defined as quasi-stable associative memory attractor state. De-
pending on the temporal characteristics of the incoming information and the plasticity of the network, 
memory may self-organize creating memes with large attractor basins, linking many unrelated input 
patterns. Memes with fake rich associations distort relations between memory states. Simulations of 
various neural network models trained with competitive Hebbian learning (CHL) on stationary and 
non-stationary data lead to the same conclusion: short learning with high plasticity followed by rapid 
decrease of plasticity leads to memes with large attraction basins, distorting input pattern representations 
in associative memory. Such system-level models may be used to understand creation of distorted beliefs 
and formation of conspiracy memes, understood as strong attractor states of the neurodynamics. 
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I. Introduction 
ELIEFS in conspiracy theories are a part of much wider subject: formation of beliefs, memes, dis-
torted memories, twisted worldviews, or in general investigating ways in which learning fails to 
represent the data faithfully. Artificial neural network community has focused on faithful learning 
methods, but there is another, neglected side of learning and memory formation. When observations are 
not learned perfectly, what types of errors one may expect, and how they influence beliefs and actions of 
the person or artificial system? Which observations will be neglected, which will be remembered, which 
will be transformed into memes that are likely to be transmitted in a distorted form to brains of other 
people?  
Memetics, introduced in the 1976 book “The Selfish Gene” by Richard Dawkins [1], tried to explain 
cultural information transfer and persistence of certain ideas in societies. Memes may be understood as 
sequences or information structures that tend to replicate in a society. Despite great initial popularity of 
memetics, and the desperate need of mathematical theories to underpin social science, theories connecting 
neuroscience and memetics have never been developed. The Journal of Memetics was discontinued in 
2005 after 8 years of electronic publishing. Memetic ideas were relegated into a set of vague philosophical 
and psychological concepts of little interest to neuroscience. The lack of efforts to understand distortions 
of information transmission and memory storage in biological learning systems is certainly related to the 
lack of theoretical models, and to the experimental difficulties in searching for memes in brain activity.  
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McNamara [2] has argued that neuroimaging technology may be used to trace memes in the brain and to 
measure how they change over time. Following Heylighen and Chielens [2] memotype and mediotype 
distinction he proposes to distinguish i-memes, internal activation of the central nervous system, from the 
external transmission/storage of information structures, the e-memes existing in the world (for example, 
created by marketing, or various media advertisements). One should distinguish clearly abstract infor-
mation structure of memes, and their implementation in the brain or in artificial cognitive system. Internal 
representations of i-memes are created by forming memory states that link neural responses resulting from 
e-meme perception to behavioral (motor) responses that are necessary for replication of memes, linking 
sensory, memory and motor subsystems in the brain. Sets of memes forming memeplexes determine world 
views, including culture, values and religions, predisposing people to accept and propagate selected 
memes.  
In the fascinating book “Why people believe weird things” Michel Shermer writes about 25 fallacies 
that lead people to believe in conspiracy theories and other bizarre things [4]. This is certainly a very 
complex topic: brains are predisposed to perceive various observed patterns as meaningful information 
(pareidolia), search for explanations and form theories, referring to the long-term episodic and semantic 
memory. Conceptual framework that is needed to interpret new observations includes memes, activated 
by various cues that invoke memory associations. Once strongly encoded memes are established it be-
comes hard to avoid the observer effect. Observations that agree with established beliefs will lead to 
strong activations of brain networks, thanks to the mutual co-activations of memeplex patterns, creating 
additional memes that make the whole memeplex even stronger. Contradicting observations will arouse 
only transient weak activations of brain networks and will be ignored. The levels-of-processing paradigm 
in memory research has found now support in neuroimaging of deep and shallow episodic memory en-
coding, modulated by a number of neurotransmitters and linked to emotional arousal [5].   
Science systematically tries to falsify hypothesis by performing experiments, but from the evolutionary 
perspective falsification is simply too dangerous. In slowly changing environment stability of beliefs is 
more important, even at the price of wide acceptance of meaningless taboos and superstitions. Even today 
educational systems in most countries do not encourage skeptical thinking. Religious leaders and con-
servative politicians are strongly opposing instating skepticism into the educational system, in fear of 
destabilization of established world views. There is little or no penalty for accepting false beliefs by in-
dividuals. Mutual support within groups of believers gives boost to distorted views of reality, leading to 
bizarre conspiracy theories.  
The complexity of the belief formation processes has discouraged scientists from approaching this 
important problem. Obviously no simple computational model is going to explain all facts related to 
formation and preservation of human beliefs, and in particular of conspiracy theories. This should not 
discourage us from forming testable hypothesis based on neurodynamics. After all simple neural network 
models introduced by Hopfield and Kohonen, despite being only loosely inspired by neurobiology, have 
found a number of applications in computational psychology and psychiatry [6], and the central role of 
large scale neural dynamics as a basis for understanding brain processes is now well recognized [7]. The 
two main goals of this paper are thus to show that memetics may be based on solid theoretical foundations 
grounded in neurodynamical models, and that learning using simple memory models may help to under-
stand the process of formation of conspiracy theories. Although only quite simple competitive learning 
models are used in this paper it opens the road towards application of more complex neural models that 
should link memetics with neuroscience.  
The next section introduces memetics and discusses representation of information in the brain. It is 
followed by a section on competitive learning models of memory formation. These models are used to 
illustrate some mechanisms of memory distortions. Remarks about implications of network simulations 
for the theory of memetics are presented in section four, and the final conclusions are in section five. 
  
 
II. Memetics and information in the brain 
A. Subjective information 
Ultimately all thoughts and beliefs result from neurodynamics. The flow of neural activation through 
neural systems is determined by many biological factors, including brain connectivity, concentration of 
neurotransmitters, emotional arousal, priming effects, brain stem activity. Information is acquired and 
internalized in the brain through direct observation of patterns in the world, including communication with 
people and animals, and indirectly through various media, texts and physical symbols of all sorts. Brains 
provide material support for mental processes, understanding and remembering symbols, ideas, stories. 
Memes are units of information that spread in cultural environment, information granules that prompt 
activation of patterns in brains molded by particular subculture. Therefore the same information may 
become a meme in some brains, and may be ignored by other brains.  
Understanding is a process that requires association of new information with what has already been 
learned. New things are learned on the basis of what is already known by the system. This is a general 
principle behind brain activity, information gain should be measured as a change induced in cognitive 
systems [8]. Patterns are encoded in memory depending on the context, sequence of events, attention 
devoted to these patterns, association with known facts, properties of already encoded information, and 
general mental state during the encoding process. Definition of Shannon information as entropy does not 
capture the intuitive meaning of the value of information for the cognitive system. The amount of optimal 
restructuring of the internal model of the environment (optimal in the minimum length description sense 
[9]) resulting from new observation (i.e. a new meme added to the memeplex) is a good subjective 
measure of the quantity of meaningful information carried out by this observation. Pragmatic infor-
mation that captures the subjective meaning of information is based on the difference between algo-
rithmic information before and after observation is made [8]. Itti and Baldi used similar idea to define the 
amount of surprise, measured as the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the 
posterior and prior distributions of beliefs in Bayesian models [10].  
B. Memes in brains 
In memetics information structures that reflect part of mental content based on a network of memes are 
called memeplexes. They evolve in response to enculturation and exposure to observed patterns. Specific 
cultural behaviors, learned concepts, word meanings, collocations or phrases describing ideas, may be 
treated as memes. Some are very rare and difficult to acquire, while others spread quickly with ease. 
Mental content can be much wider than just the network of memes. Memetics should position itself in 
respect to the theory of communication, language acquisition and learning.  
Using the language of neurodynamics a meme is defined as a quasi-stable associative memory at-
tractor state, with robust attractor basin. Brain activation A(w) prompted by stimulus w (a word, set of 
words, seeing a symbol) may rapidly evoke activation corresponding to meme A(w)  A(M(w)). The 
same attractor state may be activated by many different stimuli, including purely internal activations. For 
simple visual percepts, such as shapes of objects, similarity between brain activations A(M) in the in-
ferotemporal cortical area have been directly compared, using fMRI neuroimaging, to the similarity of the 
shapes of these objects [11]. Significant similarity has been also found in the fMRI patterns of whole brain 
activity when people think about specific objects [12], showing how meaning of concepts is encoded in 
distributed activity of the brain. Similarity between memes corresponding to perceived objects MiOi, 
may be roughly compared to some measures of similarity between object properties. Therefore similarity 
  
 
between brain activities A(M1) and A(M2) that represent two memes M1 and M2 evoked by objects O1,O2 
(percepts, cues, words) should be directly related to some measures of object similarity:  
 
               Sa(A(M1),A(M2)) ~ So(O1,O2).                                          (1) 
 
McNamara [2] hopes to detect the signature patterns of new memes by analyzing the neurodynamics of 
learning novel name–action associations for abstract category names, looking at the changes of the brain 
connectivity profiles. This may be a useful strategy for abstract categories, or for simple percepts, but 
general search for signatures of memes using neuroimaging techniques will be very difficult. Activation 
patterns may significantly differ for individual people, depending on their memeplexes. For the same 
person distribution of fMRI activations may change at different times of the day. Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) disrupting the function of the left inferior frontal gyrus has already been used to alter 
belief formation in favor of remembering more bad news [13]. Such brain stimulation may be used to 
change acceptance of memes that would normally be ignored.   
Many concepts gradually change their meaning over time. For example, the concept of a gene has 
significantly changed in recent years. Genes, once defined as sequences of DNA base pairs that code 
proteins, are now understood as distributed DNA and RNA templates, with exons on different  chromo-
somes, “encoding a coherent set of potentially overlapping functional products” [14]. Precise definition of 
a gene is difficult because they are structures of partially mutable highly organized molecular matter living 
in specific network of complex processes. They exist because highly specialized environment facilitates 
their replication. Strong coupling of all elements in this environment makes the concept of a gene rather 
fuzzy: it is not a simple DNA sequence, but a complex pattern in the whole network of processes, active 
only in certain situations controlled by epigenetic factors. The whole system is responsible for replication 
of information. Memes are even more difficult to extract from the whole network of brain activities, they 
exist more as vortices in neurodynamics that actualize only in certain context than as separate entities.   
Understanding how brain connectivity and other factors determine neurodynamics, encode beliefs, 
filter incoming information, distort it and transmits it further, is certainly a grand challenge. Complex 
information processing in the brain has not yet been understood in sufficient details to allow for devel-
opment of comprehensive theories of such processes, but some insights based on simple memory models 
may be gained. New information added to the memeplex (existing pool of interacting memes, or attractor 
states) becomes distorted, changes the memeplex, and is replicated further. Once a set of distorted 
memory states is entrenched it becomes a powerful force, attracting and distorting all information that has 
some associations with these states, creating even broader basins of attractors. Encoding of information in 
this way enhances the memeplex and is one of the reasons why conspiracy theories are so persistent.   
C. Concepts in brains and in computers 
The vector model, popular in the Natural Language Processing (NLP), represents word meaning using 
correlations between co-occurrence with other words in a window covering text around a given word. 
Vectors C(w) represent words w by averaging over many contexts restricted to a specific meaning of a 
given word. From human point of view faithful representation of word meaning should require similar 
ordering of distances D(C(w1),C(w2)) between vectors C(w1),C(w2) representing words w1, w2, as shown 
by dissimilarities between brain activations when concepts associated with these words are invoked:  
  
Sa(A(w1),A(w2)) ~ D(C(w1),C(w2))                                           (2) 
 
Each vector C(w) attempts to approximate meaning of the word that is encoded in the distribution of 
brain activity [12]. Without priming effects [15] and association of words with existing memory patterns 
  
 
only a very coarse representation is possible. Brain activations strongly depend on context, and therefore 
the distance function D(C(w1),C(w2);cont) should be context dependent. The whole process is dynamic, 
with spreading of neural activations responsible for priming related concepts and providing feedback that 
becomes part of the new pattern encoding. Meaning is thus connected to the activation of many subnet-
works in the brain, memory of sensory qualities and motor affordances. Dynamical approach to the NLP 
vector model has not yet been fully developed although some steps in this direction have been made 
[16][17]. Despite our efforts (Duch, unpublished) to describe dog breeds in terms of skin, head and body 
features derived from databases and semi-structured texts describing dogs, it was not possible to identify 
accurately dog breeds by asking questions about their features. Using images (or just silhouettes) of dogs 
leads to more accurate and faster identification of dog breeds. Brain activity evoked by hearing or reading 
words evokes internal imagery at a high level of invariant, multimodal object recognition. Similarity 
functions between objects So(O1,O2) based only on correlations between verbal descriptors, cannot do 
justice to estimations of similarity of brain activations. Finer discrimination may require recall of low-
er-level sensory qualities, referring to particular shapes, colors, movements, voice timbre or tastes. Vector 
representation based on word correlations does not reflect essential properties of the percep-
tion-action-naming activity of the brain [18], it does not even contain structural description in terms of 
object features or phonology. More details on word representation in the brain and its relation to the vector 
model may be found in [16][17]. Words are only labels that point to internalized knowledge. Represen-
tation of percepts arising from sensory imagery is a minimal requirement for NLP systems capable of 
semantic interpretation of concepts.  
In the next section competitive learning models are introduced, and then used to illustrate the process of 
learning that leads to memes based on distorted relations.  
 
III. Competitive learning and weird beliefs 
Conspiracy theories have serious consequences for politics, especially environmental policies and 
health, they facilitate growth of political extremists and dangerous religious sects. Conspiracy theories are 
investigated mainly by sociologists and psychologists, focusing on hidden networks controlling political 
and economic factors that are poorly understood. Instead of analyzing why and how brains form weird 
distorted views of reality, they invent vague concepts and construct theories that are impossible to connect 
with brain research. While there are many psychological reasons for formation of such beliefs, so far there 
have been no attempts to create a cognitive theory supported by computational models, capable of gen-
erating testable hypotheses. In the past secret societies were rather rare, but now media try to stir con-
troversy discussing GMO, vaccines, AIDS, miracle cures, UFOs, prophecies, assassinations, airplane 
crushes and other such issues, despite plausible explanations based on scientific arguments or on common 
sense consensus.  
The language of memetics has not helped to explain deeper reasons for such beliefs [1],[19]. Conspiracy 
theory may be treated as a memeplex that is easily activated by various pieces of information, giving it 
meaning consistent with the memeplex responses. From neurobiological perspective learning requires 
adaptation, changing functional connectivity, adjusting physical structure of the brain. Learning is thus 
energy-consuming, requires effort that should be carried out only when there are potential benefits. 
Simple explanation of complex phenomena have thus a great advantage even when they are quite naïve, as 
long as they do not lead to behaviors that are obviously harmful, or significantly decrease chances for 
reproduction. Evolutionary Darwinian adaptations are established only after several generations, and have 
noticeable influence on human beliefs only if they affect large subpopulations. Evolutionary factors ex-
plain slow changes in approaches to human freedom, caste and racial divisions, abandonment of slavery, 
  
 
attitudes towards children (selling children into slavery continued until 19th century) etc. Weird beliefs 
have more plausible explanation in distortions of the rapid learning process. However, the field of neural 
networks aiming at achieving perfection in learning paid little attention to distortions of learning.    
There are many scenarios that may lead to formation of distorted views of observations. Slow and 
steady environmental pressures lead to changes of attitude and may redefine the whole world view. Here I 
will focus on a rather common situation that arises as the result of rapid decrease in neuroplasticity. 
Emotional arousal coming from uncertainty of important information (ex. rumors that something poten-
tially life-threatening has happened) leads to confusion and strong anxiety (the rumors may not be true, it 
is not clear what has really happened). High emotions and stress are linked to release of large amounts of 
neurotransmitters and neuromodulators from the brain stem nuclei, through the ascending pathways, 
activating serotonin, norepinephrine, acetylcholine and dopamine systems. Strong arousal increases brain 
plasticity facilitating rapid learning of all potentially relevant cues. As it is not yet clear what in the end 
will appear as important piece of information all facts and gossips should be memorized. Uncertainty may 
persist for longer time, but after some period the situation may become clear, strong arousal will subside, 
sources of neurotransmitters will be depleted and neuroplasticity will rapidly decrease. Thus the best 
recipe for reality distortion is strong and rather persistent emotional arousal, uncertainty of information, 
gossip and suspicions, followed by a tragic end leading to depression. The system is left with memories of 
gossips frozen in its associative memory. All  future information related to the event will be associated and 
interpreted in view of what has been memorized at that period, setting foundations for conspiracy theory.  
This scenario may be reproduced in many unsupervised competitive learning models, including ART 
model that has vigilance parameter [21] to regulate neuroplasticity. Many other competitive learning 
models based on Hebbian learning have been presented in [22]. DemoGNG 2.2 Java package, written by 
Bernd Fritzke and Hartmut S. Loos [23], implements winner-take-all learning in Self-Organizing Map 
(SOM), Competitive Hebbian and Hard Competitive Learning, Neural Gas, Growing Neural Gas, 
Growing Grid, and other algorithms. In all these algorithms activity of units representing neurons is 
compared with the input, and those units with the best match adapt their parameters increasing their ac-
tivation. Neurons in the neighborhood of a winner are also allowed to adapt, depending on their distance 
from the winner. If there is no clear match constructive algorithms add new neurons allowing the network 
to grow.  
The rapid freezing of high neuroplasticity (RFHN) model described here is based on the following 
assumptions: 
 Emotions and uncertain stressful situations at the beginning of learning lead to high neuroplasticity.   
 High neuroplasticity is imitated in the model by large learning rates (due to the primary neurotrans-
mitters), and by a broad neighborhood of the winner neuron for each input pattern (due to the diffuse 
neuromodulation and volume learning).  
 The network tries to reflect associations between input vectors, adapting neuron parameters (usually 
codebook vectors) to approximate distribution of information contained in the presented input vectors.  
 Sudden decrease of the uncertainty and emotional arousal is mirrored by the decrease of learning rates 
and neighborhood sizes, leading to distortions of complex relations between input items. 
 Slow forgetting that follows rapid freezing is based on memory reactivations, and contributes to the 
retention of memory states represented by the highest number of neurons only, forming clusters of 
nodes with large and strong basins of attraction that link many states.  
 Clusters of neurons that are frequently activated and thus easily replicated represent memes.  
 Conspiracy theories are characterized by memplexes, numerous strong memes, with many neurons 
encoding information that has never been presented, forming distorted associations between facts. 
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As a result these networks do not reflect real observations. The RFHN model may be simulated using 
several competitive learning models. In fact all such models show similar behavior, therefore only the 
Self-Organized Maps [20], and Neural Gas model with Competitive Hebbian Learning (NG-CHL) [24] 
are shown below for illustration.  
The basic idea of competitive learning is to approximate the activity of neural cell assemblies by neu-
rons (units) that serve as codebook vectors W(t). They represent receptive fields, adapting to the proba-
bility density of the incoming signals. Each neuron receives input signals and competes with other neurons 
using the winner-takes-most (or takes all) principle, leaving only a small subset of active units that are 
updated. The winning neural assembly is represented by a vector W(c)(t) and a small group of vectors in its 
direct neighborhood O(c). SOM starts with a fixed two-dimensional grid of neurons. Learning proceeds 
by identifying most similar codebook vector to the current observation X(t), and updating the codebook 
vector and vectors in its immediate physical neighborhood according to the formula:    
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where the neighborhood is usually assumed to be Gaussian: 
 
                (4) 
 
The size of this neighborhood is decreased from the initial value of dispersion i  to the final value f  
according to the formula:  
  
                           (5) 
 
The maximal age tmax determines the annealing schedule. The learning rate is similarly decreased by:  
  
                         (6) 
 
 
SOM model has been used with success in many applications, for example it works quite well, in com-
parison to other neural models, for explanation of details of orientation and ocular dominance columns in 
the visual cortex [25].  
The NG-CHL algorithm does not have such fixed initial grid topology as does SOM, new neurons are 
recruited for encoding input patterns like gas particles. At each adaptation step a connection between the 
winner and the second-nearest unit is created, if it does not already exist. The newly created or existing 
selected edges are refreshed receiving age=0, while the age of other edges emanating from the winner 
neurons are increased by 1. The reference age is gradually changed from Ti to Tf  according to:   
  
                      (7) 
 
 
Edges that are not refreshed for more than T(t) steps are removed. This simulates forgetting mechanism.  
Following computational experiments have been done to illustrate RFHN model: 
 Training SOM and NG-CHL on stationary data concentrated in two distinct areas, with initial high 
plasticity and rapidly decreasing learning rates. 
 Training SOM and NG-CHL on non-stationary data from observations that move and suddenly change, 
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with initial high plasticity and rapidly decreasing learning rates. 
 Retraining the model after malformation of relations has already occurred, using temporally increased 
plasticity.  
The number of neurons in the brain is extremely large, therefore it is instructive to check how the 
number of network nodes in simulations will affect distributions. For the stationary experiments 10.000 
nodes have been used, with initial parameters randomly distributed, and signals coming from two sepa-
rated circular areas. This should represent two alternative situations that are monitored. For the 
non-stationary situation all parameters were initially concentrated in the rectangular patch, simulating 
situations in which restricted domain has already been learned and stable. Then the patch moves across the 
whole domain providing new input patterns (observations) from the areas it covers. When the edge of the 
domain is reached the patch jumps to the other side.  
IV. Conspiracies and memory distortions 
A. Stationary situation 
Perfect representation of all signals should cover two distinct circular areas. A good solution that re-
quires slow learning with 500.000 steps is shown below. The domain and relations (represented by edges) 
of input patterns are represented fairly well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training 100x100 SOM network, with initial i=5, f =0.01, i=1, f =0.001, for 10.000 steps, did not 
pull all parameters of neurons towards data area. Despite high density of neurons some gaps have been left 
and were not removed by further retraining. This effect comes from the dynamics of learning with 
shrinking neighborhoods. There is a greater chance for neurons near the edge to be pulled towards high 
density areas by many neurons that are selected as winners than to be pulled towards the data in the gap 
Fig. 1. SOM network learning slowly stationary uniform samples drawn from double circles 
approximates these distributions correctly. 
Fig.  2. SOM network learning the same distribution as in Fig. 1, with fast decrease of 
plasticity covers areas where no samples appeared and leaves large gaps in the data space. 
  
 
area. Moreover, in the space where no samples ever appeared many neurons are placed, and this will lead 
to false associations and confabulations (Fig. 2). These effects are random due to stochastic nature of 
learning. The resulting map has the same character although details differ every time it is simulated.   
The NG-CHL model with initial high plasticity and rapidly decreasing learning rates has also produced 
big gaps and high density areas, as seen in Fig. 3. Forgetting parameters have been set to edgei=20  and 
edgef  =200. Further retraining with fast forgetting creates even bigger gaps. Many input patterns are 
therefore associated with high density clusters acting as memes. Associations with other input patterns are 
based more on stereotypes (clusters) rather than faithful observations. 
  
                                          
Fig. 3. The Neural Gas model with fast decrease of plasticity creates even stronger distortion of original distribution  
than SOM map in Fig. 2, leaving many gaps and covering empty space densely. 
B. Non-stationary situations 
Learning in nonstationary situation is much more difficult and therefore distortions are much stronger. 
Using the same parameters as for the stationary case SOM started with high plasticity and that was rapidly 
decreased (in 10.000 steps). The map in Fig. 4 shows very strong concentration of neurons that point to the 
initial patterns, and the network did not learn much during later part of the training. It has ignored most of 
the facts coming after rapid learning period, creating one big sink for all associations. Such network will 
interpret most input data as similar to what it has seen in the critical period of high plasticity.   
                                     
Fig.  4. SOM with rapidly decreasing plasticity for non-stationary distribution; samples come here from a moving square (seen in the left 
corner) and with very slow learning are uniformly distributed in the whole rectangle, but fast learning leads to completely distorted view. 
Further training with increased plasticity may somehow repair the distorted view, although even after a 
very long training (Fig. 5) strong meme that has been formed in the center is still present. Large basin of 
attraction for this meme will lead to its activation frequent activation even by irrelevant input patterns. 
After additional 100.000 steps the central sink has loosened providing still distorted, but more diversified 
map.   
  
 
                                               
Fig.  5. Non-stationary case, Neural Gas map as in Fig. 4, followed by long slow training (100.000 steps) only partially recovers uniform 
distribution, leaving large concentration of the codebook vectors in the middle.  
The NG-CHL algorithm may also create completely distorted representation. After 40.000 steps with 
rapid decrease of plasticity it has created two separate memplexes, each with several strong memes that 
are used to interpret all incoming patterns (Fig. 6). 
                                           
Fig.  6. In the non-stationary case Neural Gas created two densly connected structures 
Maps created with rapid decrease of initially high plasticity are quite unstable. In Fig. 7 another solution 
is shown with 4 larger memeplexes that completely distort view of the input patterns. It is quite difficult to 
create faithful representation of input patterns for non-stationary signals. Very long training times with 
several hundred thousand iterations are needed to achieve it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  7. Another neural gas map for non-stationary case, showing how unstable such learning 
may be. 
  
 
In case of rapidly changing situations it is much more likely that a distorted view will be learned instead 
of a faithful representation of reality. Gaining experience in changing environment obviously takes more 
time, as can be observed in many domains such as medicine, where initial background knowledge is 
slowly structured into high competence by working environment.  
V. Conclusion 
Biological and psychological belief forming mechanisms are very complicated. Predispositions for 
accepting distorted views of reality may come as a side effect of education and life experiences and 
therefore are rather hard to investigate. Accepting simple explanations is rewarding, creates pleasant 
feelings of understanding. Complex explanations requires a lot of effort and a long time to understand 
them fully. A simple (although inadequate) explanation is always better than to have no explanation at all, 
saving energy required for learning and creating a (false) impression of reducing uncertainty.  
Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? Because this is how their brains work. Neurodynamics 
helps to understand the conditions under which large basins of attractions, called memes, are created in 
memory networks, how and why they form memplexes that lead to the distorted associations. This is an 
important step towards linking memetics with theoretical and experimental brain science. Perhaps memes 
can be measured [2], and computer simulations should help to define most suitable experimental condi-
tions. With the advent of highly detailed brain simulations and neuroimaging techniques we should be 
able to understand precisely the mechanism behind false memory formation. Perhaps this could be one of 
the results of the Human Brain Project [26]. However, it should be possible to repeat the experiments on 
artificial distributions with maps based on texts in some restricted domain. Each network node will rep-
resent than a word and distances between words will be based on their similarity in a given context. Such 
models should allow for semi-realistic analysis of formation of distorted world views.  
What lessons can we draw from computational experiments with competitive learning? The rapid 
freezing of high neuroplasticity (RFHN) model presented here is very simple, but it seems that all types of 
competitive learning models show similar behavior. More complex models with high-dimensional input 
patterns almost certainly will have even bigger problems with faithful representation of input patterns 
using the rapid freezing of neuroplasticity scenario, and will lead to large attractor basins that can be 
interpreted as memes. Slow learning leads to faithful representations, but if the information is false (for 
example, frequently repeated in media) it may also end in conspiracy theory. A lie repeated ten thousand 
times becomes truth, as the famous “Big Lie” propaganda technique.  
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, memetics theory has been developed in social sci-
ences but a link to neuroscience has been missing. Linking memes to attractors of neurodynamics should 
help to give memetics solid foundations. Second, analysis of formation of weird beliefs is very important, 
but so far there have been no models of brain processes that could explain creation of such beliefs. Sim-
ulations presented here should draw attention to the need of analysis of the type of distortions that are 
common in neural networks. Of course more complex neural models will be needed to allow for predic-
tions that could be compared with the results of neuroimaging and behavioral experiments, but even such 
coarse models based on competitive learning networks may serve as an illustration of putative processes 
responsible for formation of various conspiracy theories. Our next step is to perform such simulations on 
real data from the newspapers. Other computational models that deal with false memories, such as ART 
[21] and Associative Self-Organizing Network (ASON) that has been used to explain emergence of false 
memories [27] will also be considered.  
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